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This case concerns the criminal history provisions of the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  A defendant’s criminal history is 
calculated by assigning points for prior sentences.  The 
Guidelines instruct that prior sentences “always are counted 
separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses that were 
separated by an intervening arrest.”  United States Sentencing 
Commission, Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(a)(2) (USSG).  The 
question presented here is whether a traffic stop, followed by 
the issuance of a summons, constitutes an intervening arrest in 
the context of the criminal history Guidelines. 
I 
John Francis Ley pleaded guilty in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to a 
single count of being a convicted felon in possession of a 
firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  
According to the presentence investigation report prepared by 
the United States Probation Office, Ley sustained a 2006 
conviction for felony aggravated assault in Pennsylvania.  The 
report classified this conviction as a “crime of violence” under 
the career-offender Guideline, USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1), and 
recommended a base offense level of 20.  See Id. § 
2K2.1(a)(4)(A).  Various adjustments produced a total offense 
level of 19. 
The criminal history Guidelines require the cumulative 
counting of sentences for offenses that are separated by an 
intervening arrest.  Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2).  If there is no intervening 
arrest, however, prior sentences are counted as a single 
sentence if those sentences were imposed on the same day.  Id.  
Ley’s long criminal record earned him seven criminal history 
points with a criminal history category of IV.  Two of those 
seven points were based on prior convictions for possession of 
drug paraphernalia.  The first offense stemmed from a traffic 
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stop on September 28, 2015; the second from a traffic stop the 
following day.  After each, the police released Ley from the 
scene and advised him that the case would proceed via 
summons.  Ley pleaded guilty and was sentenced for both 
offenses on the same day in May 2016.  His total offense level 
and criminal history category together produced a Guidelines 
sentencing range of 46 to 57 months of imprisonment. 
Ley objected to the presentence report, arguing that his 
two prior drug paraphernalia sentences should be treated as a 
single sentence because they were imposed on the same day 
and were separated not by an intervening arrest, but by a traffic 
stop, followed by the issuance of a summons to appear.  Had 
the sentences been treated as a single sentence, Ley argued, he 
would have only been assessed six criminal history points, 
resulting in a criminal history category of III, rather than IV, 
and a sentencing range of 36 to 47 months. 
The District Court tentatively overruled Ley’s 
objection.  Two days later, the Probation Office filed a 
supplemental addendum standing by its position in the 
presentence report.  Ley was eventually sentenced to 46 
months’ imprisonment, the lowest end of the applicable 
Guidelines range.  This appeal followed. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  This Court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, 
and review its factual findings for clear error.  United States v. 
Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 146 (3d Cir. 2015). 
III 
The central issue to be discussed requires the Court to 
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determine whether the word “arrest,” as it appears in USSG § 
4A1.2(a)(2), includes a traffic stop, followed by a summons to 
appear.  If it does not, the District Court miscalculated Ley’s 
criminal history and, by extension, his sentencing range.  
Before considering that question, we first address the 
Government’s contention that the record establishes that Ley 
was subject to an intervening arrest.  
A 
The Government asserts that the supplemental 
addendum to the presentence report shows that, as a factual 
matter, Ley was arrested on September 28, 2015.  Responding 
to Ley’s objection to the presentence report’s treatment of his 
drug paraphernalia convictions as separate sentences, the 
supplemental addendum states: “In this case, the defendant was 
arrested for the first offense . . . on September 28, 2015.  [This] 
not only is supported by the narrative in [the presentence 
report], but also [by] the Magisterial District Court Docket 
Sheet, the defendant’s sentencing order, and the defendant’s 
rap sheet, all of which list the defendant’s arrest date as 
‘September 28, 2015.’”  But the supplemental addendum also 
forthrightly adds that “[d]efense counsel is correct that the 
defendant was released from the scene on September 28, 2015, 
and [advised] that the case would proceed via summons.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).   
Nothing in the documents cited in the supplemental 
addendum indicates in any way that Ley was arrested on 
September 28, 2015.  The narrative for that offense in the 
presentence report says not one word about an arrest.  Nor can 
we say the listing of Ley’s “arrest date” in the state court 
records—which were never produced in the District Court—
demonstrates that Ley was in fact arrested.  For all we know, 
those records treat the date of the issuance of a summons as an 
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“arrest date.”  Of course, we can only speculate—and 
speculation is all the Government has to work with here.  
In our view, the supplemental addendum merely 
restates the legal dispute between the Government and Ley; it 
does not create a new factual one.  As the District Court 
described the supplemental addendum at sentencing, the 
document serves as “the Probation Office’s retort to [Ley’s] 
position that the two arrests or two experiences with law 
enforcement in September [2015] that followed one day after 
another were not being treated as one offense,” thus 
demonstrating the Probation Office’s “agree[ment] with the 
[District] Court’s finding that a [traffic stop, followed by a] 
summons counts as an arrest.”  App. 36.  We agree with the 
District Court, and find it difficult to accept that the 
supplemental addendum stands for the factual proposition the 
Government ascribes to it.   
The Government nonetheless insists that we should not 
entertain any of Ley’s arguments concerning the supplemental 
addendum.  Since Ley never raised an objection to the 
supplemental addendum either at sentencing or in his opening 
brief in this Court, the Government asserts that Ley waived any 
challenge to the facts set forth in that document.  See United 
States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 342 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]o 
preserve an argument and avoid waiver, the argument 
presented in the Court of Appeals must depend on both the 
same legal rule and the same facts as the argument presented 
in the District Court.”); United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 
222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant’s failure 
to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes 
waiver of that issue on appeal.”).  At the same time, the 
Government concedes that Ley has clearly preserved the legal 
issue of whether a traffic stop, followed by a summons, is an 
intervening arrest.  The Government’s claim of waiver 
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therefore rises or falls on the import of the supplemental 
addendum. 
Our precedent on waiver draws a distinction between 
“issues” and “arguments”—“an issue can be broader in scope 
than an argument in that an issue may be addressed by multiple 
arguments, which are the most basic building blocks of legal 
reasoning.”  Joseph, 730 F.3d at 337.  To preserve an argument 
for appeal, a party “must have raised the same argument in the 
District Court—merely raising an issue that encompasses the 
appellate argument is not enough.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  
As we have explained, the supplemental addendum adds no 
factual controversy to the pure legal dispute over the 
interpretation of the word “arrest.”  It follows that the 
Government’s attempt to manufacture waiver must be rejected. 
  B 
The Court now turns to the parties’ dispute over the 
District Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines.  
Chapter 4 of the Guidelines contains provisions detailing the 
manner in which district courts are to compute a defendant’s 
criminal history.  Section 4A1.1 assigns various point values 
to prior sentences.  The term “prior sentence” is defined as “any 
sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, 
whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for 
conduct not part of the instant offense.”  USSG § 4A1.2(a)(1).  
Section 4A1.2(a)(2) sets forth what is known as the “single 
sentence” rule.  In relevant part, it provides: 
If the defendant has multiple prior sentences, 
determine whether those sentences are counted 
separately or treated as a single sentence.  Prior 
sentences always are counted separately if the 
sentences were imposed for offenses that were 
separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the 
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defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to 
committing the second offense).  If there is no 
intervening arrest, prior sentences are counted 
separately unless (A) the sentences resulted from 
offenses contained in the same charging 
instrument; or (B) the sentences were imposed 
on the same day.  Treat any prior sentence 
covered by (A) or (B) as a single sentence.     
 
USSG § 4A1.2(a)(2) (emphasis added).  The Sentencing 
Commission first added the “intervening arrest” language in 
1991 as an application note to section 4A1.2.  USSG app. C, 
amend. 382 (effective Nov. 1, 1991).  It was later moved to the 
body of section 4A1.2(a)(2) in 2011.  Id. App. C, amend. 709 
(effective Nov. 1, 2011).    
Counting prior sentences as a single sentence can have 
significant consequences for a defendant.  For Ley, it would 
mean one fewer criminal history point, resulting in a lower 
criminal history category and, in turn, a lower recommended 
sentencing range.  The single sentence rule also applies to other 
aspects of the Guidelines, including classification as a career 
offender, id. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.3, and computation of the base 
offense level for certain crimes, e.g., id. § 2K1.3 cmt. n.9 
(offenses involving explosive materials); id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.10 
(offenses involving firearms or ammunition); id. § 2L1.2 cmt. 
n.3 (unlawful entering or remaining in the U.S.).  
As with statutory interpretation, we “read Guidelines 
provisions for their plain meaning.”  United States v. Stinson, 
734 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 
(1979) (“It is a fundamental canon” of textual interpretation 
that “unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as 
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taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”).  In 
ordinary usage, an “arrest” is “the taking or detainment (of a 
person) in custody by authority of law” or “legal restraint of 
the person; custody, imprisonment.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 109-10 (unabridged ed. 1993) 
(Webster’s Third); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 124 (9th 
ed. 2009) (Black’s) (“The taking or keeping of a person in 
custody by legal authority, [especially] in response to a 
criminal charge . . . .”).  A “summons,” by contrast, is “a 
warning or citation to appear in court,” such as “an order to 
appear to answer a criminal charge [usually] for a minor 
offense where arrest of the defendant is not regarded as 
appropriate or necessary.”  Webster’s Third 2290; see also 
Black’s 1574 (“A writ or process commencing the plaintiff’s 
action and requiring the defendant to appear and answer.”). 
The ordinary usage of the term arrest does not sensibly 
include the issuance of a summons.  Consider the everyday 
example of jaywalking.  Out of concern for the safety of 
pedestrians and drivers alike, many states and municipalities—
including every jurisdiction in the Third Circuit—make 
jaywalking unlawful.  See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 15 §§ 4108-
09, 4141; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 39:4-32 to -34; 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3543; V.I. Code Ann. tit. 23 §§ 410, 413-14, 416, 420.  The 
Government confirmed its position at oral argument that a 
jaywalking summons would count as an arrest for purposes of 
the criminal history Guidelines.  But were a summons actually 
treated as an arrest in the real world, the changes in settled 
expectations would be far-reaching.  Government agencies ask 
about arrest records when hiring for jobs ranging from 
sensitive national security positions to police officers to prison 
guards.  Similar examples abound, including private-sector 
employment applications, college admissions, visa 
applications, and background checks.  See United States v. 
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Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(McKeown, J., concurring).  Treating a summons as an arrest, 
it is safe to say, “defies our common experience and would be 
a paradigmatic shift.”  Id. 
It should come as no surprise, then, that constitutional 
criminal procedure jurisprudence has long distinguished 
arrests and summonses (and the summons’s close sibling, the 
citation).  Under the Fourth Amendment, for example, 
concerns for officer safety and preservation of evidence permit 
the police to conduct a warrantless search of an individual 
incident to arresting him.  See United States v. Robinson, 414 
U.S. 218 (1973).  But in Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998), 
the Supreme Court held that such authority does not extend to 
the issuance of a citation following a traffic stop.  In so 
concluding, Knowles declined to analogize the issuance of a 
traffic citation to a formal, custodial arrest.  See id. at 117 (“The 
threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation . . . is a 
good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest.”).   
In the context of damages actions brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment, this 
Court has refused to treat the issuance of a summons as a 
seizure, much less an arrest.  In DiBella v. Borough of 
Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599 (3d Cir. 2005), we explained that the 
plaintiffs there “were only issued a summons; they were never 
arrested; they never posted bail; they were free to travel; and 
they did not have to report to Pretrial Services.”  Id. at 603. 
Like this Court, the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits 
have determined that a summons requiring the appearance in 
court does not amount to a Fourth Amendment seizure.  See 
Britton v. Mahoney, 196 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 1999); Burg v. 
Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 2010); Bielanski v. County 
of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 642 (7th Cir. 2008).  The Sixth and 
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Tenth Circuits have reached the same conclusion when it 
comes to traffic citations.  See DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 
180 F.3d 770, 789 (6th Cir. 1999); Martinez v. Carr, 479 F.3d 
1292, 1298-99 (10th Cir. 2007) (Gorsuch, J.); see also 
Technical Ordnance, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.3d 641, 651 
(8th Cir. 2001) (“This circuit has never held that pretrial 
restrictions such as [a summons to appear in court] constitute a 
Fourth Amendment seizure.”); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 5.1(i), at p. 104 (5th ed. 2012) (“Resort to the 
citation or summons alternative is not in and of itself an arrest 
or, for that matter, any variety of Fourth Amendment 
seizure.”).     
A similar understanding of arrest is reflected in caselaw 
regarding Miranda warnings that the police must give suspects 
under custodial interrogation.  A suspect is “in custody” for 
Miranda purposes when there is “a formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal 
arrest.”  Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court has 
held, however, that a roadside interrogation of a motorist 
pulled over during a traffic stop is not a “formal arrest” because 
a motorist is not “completely at the mercy of the police,” but 
instead expects a “presumptively temporary and brief” 
encounter in which “he may . . . be given a citation” and “in 
the end . . . most likely will be allowed to continue on his way.”  
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 (1984); see also 
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113 (2010) (“[T]he 
temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in 
a traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda 
custody.” (citation omitted)).  This is so notwithstanding “the 
aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer” 
during a traffic stop “and the knowledge that the officer has 
some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation.”  
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Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438.  Miranda instead comes into play 
during a traffic stop “as of the moment [the suspect is] formally 
placed under arrest.”  Id. at 434.   
The foregoing considerations, it is fair to conclude, all 
point in one direction: a traffic stop, followed by the issuance 
of a summons, is not an arrest.  The Court therefore holds that, 
for purposes of section 4A1.2(a)(2) of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, an arrest is a formal, custodial arrest.  This accords 
with the view of three other courts of appeals.  The Sixth 
Circuit has held that the issuance of a summons for a felony 
aggravated assault charge is not an intervening arrest, see 
United States v. Powell, 798 F.3d 431, 436-40 (6th Cir. 2015), 
and the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held the same for the 
issuance of a traffic citation for driving with a suspended 
license.  See Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d at 1040-44; United States v. 
Wright, 862 F.3d 1265, 1281-83 (11th Cir. 2017).   
Only the Seventh Circuit sees things differently.  In 
United States v. Morgan, 354 F.3d 621, 623-24 (7th Cir. 2003), 
a decision handed down when the Guidelines were still 
mandatory and binding on federal courts, the Seventh Circuit 
held that the issuance of a traffic citation counts as an 
intervening arrest under section 4A1.2(a)(2) of the Guidelines.  
Morgan observed that “[a] traffic stop is an ‘arrest’ in federal 
parlance.”  Id. at 624.  But for reasons already discussed, that 
statement is incorrect.  A traffic stop is not an arrest in federal 
parlance; it is “a relatively brief encounter and ‘is more 
analogous to a so-called “Terry stop” than to a formal arrest.’”  
Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439).  
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit later recognized as much with 
regard to summonses.  See Bielanski, 550 F.3d at 642 (“No 
court has held that a summons alone constitutes a seizure, and 
we conclude that a summons alone does not equal a seizure for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.”). 
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The two primary cases Morgan cites—Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 
532 U.S. 318 (2001)—cannot bear the weight the Seventh 
Circuit places on them.  The question confronted in Whren had 
nothing to do with the authority of the police to arrest; the 
Supreme Court instead determined that the temporary 
detention of a motorist upon probable cause that a traffic 
violation occurred is objectively reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  517 U.S. at 809-10.  To be sure, while Atwater 
recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a 
police officer from arresting an individual for a misdemeanor 
offense that could otherwise be answerable by a summons, 532 
U.S. at 354, its holding does not ipso facto turn all such police 
encounters into an arrest.  Atwater itself acknowledged that 
“there is a world of difference between making that judgment 
in choosing between the discretionary leniency of a summons 
in place of a clearly lawful arrest, and making the same 
judgment when the question is the lawfulness of the 
warrantless arrest itself.”  Id. at 350.  And for good reason.  As 
the Tenth Circuit aptly put it, equating the issuance of a traffic 
citation with a Fourth Amendment seizure might 
“disincentivize the use of citations, at least to a certain degree, 
a result inconsistent with the desire to mitigate intrusiveness on 
private citizens and recent efforts to encourage the use of 
citation in lieu of arrest procedure.”  Martinez, 479 F.3d at 
1297 (footnote omitted). 
The Seventh Circuit also rested its decision on the 
contention that “[c]alling a traffic stop an ‘arrest’ implements 
the Sentencing Commission’s goal” of identifying recidivists.  
Morgan, 354 F.3d at 623.  Again, we disagree.  Both the 
sentencing statute and the Guidelines require that a defendant’s 
sentence and criminal history not be overstated.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a) (“The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but 
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not greater than necessary . . . .”); United States v. Fries, 796 
F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The purpose of [section] 
4A1.2 is to reflect the seriousness of a defendant’s criminal 
history, while, at the same time, avoiding overstating the 
seriousness of the defendant’s criminal conduct.” (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted)).  By treating an 
intervening custodial arrest for a serious offense the same as 
the issuance of a summons for jaywalking or possession of 
drug paraphernalia, the Seventh Circuit’s reading of section 
4A1.2(a)(2) risks substantially overstating a defendant’s 
criminal history. 
While section 4A1.2(a)(2)’s single sentence rule may at 
times also understate the seriousness of a defendant’s criminal 
history and the danger he presents to the public, the Guidelines 
advise district courts that in such a case “an upward departure 
may be warranted.”  USSG § 4A1.2 cmt. n.3(B).  The 
Sentencing Commission has thus shown itself fully capable of 
responding to concerns about application of the single sentence 
rule.  If the issuance of a summons should be treated as an 
arrest under the criminal history Guidelines, the Commission 
knows how to do so.  That is its role.  Ours is a more modest 
one: to faithfully take account of the Guidelines validly 
promulgated by the Commission, and to interpret the text of 
those Guidelines according to its plain meaning. 
IV 
Ley raises two other issues for our consideration.  First, 
he contends that the District Court inappropriately enhanced 
his sentence when it determined that his prior Pennsylvania 
aggravated assault conviction was a “crime of violence.”  And 
second, Ley says that the District Court improperly fixed his 
term of imprisonment based upon his need for rehabilitation, 
in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a).  See Tapia v. United 
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States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011).  Since our disposition on the 
intervening arrest question is sufficient on its own to require 
resentencing, we do not address these additional arguments.   
The judgment of the District Court will be vacated, and 
the case will be remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
